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A Psycho-social Analysis of the Concept
of Family as Used in Zoning Laws
Geoffrey R. Scott*
I. Introduction
Since the founding of the Republic, the American political and
judicial systems have frequently mediated conflicts between funda-
mental principles of personal endowment,' utilitarianism, 2 and egali-
tarianism.3 These confrontations have set interests in personal lib-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1968, Valparaiso University;
J.D. Valparaiso University; L.L.M. 1973, Yale University. Special thanks to Karen and Tippi
Scott.
1. Endowment based criteria, utilitarian criteria, and equity criteria are the three domi-
nant measures influencing the just distribution of resources. The personal endowment theory
recognizes "a person's innate right to the fruits of his efforts, thereby giving ethical support to
the distribution of factor endowment and the pricing of factors on the market." P. MUSGRAVE
& R. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (2d ed. 1976). The theory
finds expression in the writings of natural law philosophers:
The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being. . . . Yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be
a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use
• . . to any particular man ...
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person. The labour of his body and the work of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by the
labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men.
J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF GOVERNMENT,
16 (Barker ed. 1962).
[Slome things there be that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common.
There, the Law of Nature which prescribeth equity requireth: . . . Nature is
either primo geniture . . . or first seizure. [T]hings which cannot be enjoyed in
common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and in some
cases to the first born ...
I. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part 1, Chap. 15, 94-95 (Great Books ed. 1952). See also Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1805).
2. Utilitarianism proposes to distribute wealth as to achieve the greatest sum total of
happiness. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION, THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS (1959).
3. Founded upon a humanistic perspective of the worth of each individual, egalitarian-
ism posits that equality of welfare is an inherent value in distributive justice. Rousseau
explains:
All men have a natural right to what is necessary to them. But the positive
act which establishes a man's claim to any particular item of property limits him
to that and excludes him from all others . . . that is why the right of 'first
erty; freedom of speech, religion and association; property; the work
ethic; and the ideals of capitalism have been set against goals of
equal opportunity and result.4 Certain accommodations have been
reached and balances have been struck. For example, such native
characteristics as race, sex, religion, and ethnic origin have been af-
firmed as arbitrary and illegitimate qualifications for defined bene-
fits. This, of necessity, has altered the practices of individuals in re-
gards to whom they might hire,8 with whom they might work and
occupancy,' however weak it be in a state of nature, is guaranteed to every
man ...
In order that the right of 'first occupancy' may be legalized, the following
conditions must be present. (1) There must be no one already living on the land
in question. (2) A man must occupy only so much of it as is necessary for his
subsistence.
J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IX, 187 (Barker ed. 1962). Karl Marx stated the
principle thusly: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." K.
MARX, Critique of the Gotham Programer, THE MARX-ENGELs READER (Tucken ed. 1972).
See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Wel-
fare: The Emerging Legal Issues 74 YALE L.J. 1645 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
4. See J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983)[hereinafter
cited as FISHKIN]; A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970)[hereinafter cited as WESTIN].
Where does the United States fall in this spectrum of socio-political bal-
ances. . .? I would term it an egalitarian democratic balance, in which the pri-
vacy-supporting values of individualism, associational life, and civil liberty are
under constant pressure from privacy denying tendencies toward social egalitari-
anism, personal activism, and political fundamentalism.
Id. at 27. Justice Harlow eloquently described the balancing under the due process clause:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supply-
ing of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational
process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the bal-
ance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from
it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is
likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judg-
ment and restraint.
.. . [T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech,
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints, (citations omitted). . . and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particu-
larly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1976). See also Arizona Governing Committee
for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S.Ct 3492 (1983)
(sex discrimination in retirement plan); Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.
E.E.O.C. 103 S.Ct 2622 (1983) (sex discrimination in health plan); Snapp & Sons v. Puerto
Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, (1982).
publicly associate,' to whom they might transfer an interest in prop-
erty,7 and what they might say.8
While it has been the hope that these authoritative and forceful
statements might positively alter the perceptions and perspectives of
the relevant populations, regulation has to a large extent focused on
expression rather than value formation.9 Influence has been the
stratagem employed to precipitate change in the collective con-
science. Contemporaneously, courts and legislatures have secured the
rights to individuals to select their spouse, 10 control their ability to
procreate,11 associate privately with whom they desire, 12 and define
the home environment.18 These latter actions often appear similar to
the former, yet differ subtly and significantly. They not only affirm
rights of expression of individual values but also secure an interest in
shared values and family autonomy.
Herein lies a constitutional dilemma. A political structure relies
upon the successful cultural integration of individuals for stability.
In pursuit of this goal, the United States, as a Democratic Republic,
has traditionally recognized the family as a vital organ for the culti-
vation and transmission of positive social-political values. The family
thus is in the service of the government.
Simultaneously, the existence of this small independent political
unit insures moderation of the influence of government in its impacts
upon individuals. The family serves as a barrier between the person
6. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (affirmative action in construction
contracts); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, (1977)
(racial discrimination in seniority systems); Ticeman v. Whealen - Haver Recreational Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)(discrimination in country club
violates Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wright v. Salisbury Club. Ltd., 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.
1980). See also Palmer v. Thompson 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing swimming pools in lieu of
integration); City of Memphis v. N.T. Green, 951 U.S. 100 (1981) (closing street between
racial areas permitted).
7. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); Fair Housing Provisions of
Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1976).
8. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (power to restrict
adult theater to certain areas); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904)
(power to exclude from the mail information of a character "calculated to debauch the public
morality").
9. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
10. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1976); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1970); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
11. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 at 639-40 (1974), the Court
stated that it has long recognized that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
12. See supra note 7; President of the Village of Skokie v. Collin, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 402 U.S. 994 (1972). See also Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
570 (1925); Meyers v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
and the state. Continued personal freedom may depend on retaining
the character of the family inviolate. A healthy deference to plural-
ism and the acceptance and promotion of diverse and eclectic phy-
letic value systems assures content to such freedoms as speech, reli-
gion, and association.
The constitutional structure is in part however, responsible for
the value content of the family phenomenon. Demands of equal pro-
tection, due process, and the police power may legitimate curtailing
the expression of certain values transmitted in the process of
socialization. 4
As President Lyndon B. Johnson noted in a speech at Howard
University, "[t]he family is the cornerstone of our society. More
than any other force it shapes the attitudes, the hopes, the ambitions
and the values of the child." 8
The statement is, however, an equivocal observation. A stable
and enriching family environment full of acceptable values is a vehi-
cle of effective physical and psycho-social development and adapta-
tion. Conversely, the absence of a positive family environment signif-
icantly impedes the cultivation of natural abilities. "Ability is not
just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or stunted by the fam-
ily that you live with and the neighborhood that you live in . . ." 16
Inherent in this statement is a recognition that the family is a vehi-
cle for the transmission of such factor endowments as human grace
and virtue, wealth, social status, ability, and native characteristics.
These may, of course, lead to inequality in opportunity or result
among families and individuals. Rawls observes:
Within the limits allowed by the background arrangements, dis-
tributive shares are decided by the outcomes of the natural lot-
tery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective.
There is no more reason to permit the distinction of income and
wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by
historical and social fortune. Furthermore, the principle of fair
opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long
as the institution of the family exists. The extent to which natu-
ral capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds
of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to
make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary
sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circum-
stances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of
achievement and culture for those similarly endowed .... 17
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See supra note 7.
15. 1965 PUB. PAPERS at 639 (1966).
16. Id. at 636.
17. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 73 (1971)..
In an attempt to mitigate both the personal and social adverse
influences of natural fortune, courts and legislatures have fashioned
theories of affirmative obligation that have permitted state interven-
tion into the composition of family value content. When the family
structure begins to dissolve the state has justifiably responded to a
request by the participants to assume a role in the reorganization of
the unit and the realignment of the several interests.' 8 When the
consensual character of the relationship deteriorates the state has in-
tervened on behalf of what has been determined to be the best inter-
ests of the individual participants.19
When, conversely, the internal integrity of the family is sound,
the state should exhibit restraint in forcefully interfering with the
unit.2 0 Such is the demand of democracy. As John Stuart Mill sug-
gested in On Liberty,
[s]ociety can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues
. . any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to
meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many
kinds of political oppression, since. . .it leaves fewer means of
escapes, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life,
and enslaving the soul itself ...
The object of this Essay is to assert a very simple principle
.. . that principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted individually or collectively, in interfering with the lib-
erty of action of any of their number is self protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others.
2 1
In recent years the concept of family has been a subject of con-
siderable interest in legal disputes concerning the care of disabled
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970); J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY
AND THE LAW (1965).
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 604(b)(1976); See also J. GOLD-
STEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1980).
20.
The family, as the immediate substantiality of mind, is specifically characterized
by Love, which is mind's feeling of its own unity. Since in a family, one's frame
of mind is to have self-consciousness of one's individuality within this unity as
the absolute essence of oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an indepen-
dent person but as a member.
The right which the individual enjoys or the strength of the family unity
and which is in the first place simply the individual's life within this unity, takes
on the form of right ... only when the family begins to dissolve. At that point
those who should be family-members both in their inclination and in actuality
begin to be self-subsistent persons, and where as they formerly constituted one
specific moment within the whole, they now receive their share separately. ...
G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 158-159 (Great Books ed. 1952)[hereinafter cited
as HEGEL].
21. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, 6, 13 (Kirk ed. 1955)(emphasis added).
citizens within local communities. On January 23, 1984, the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman22 fueled the fires of concern. However, in all
these legal discussions, insufficient attention has been given to a con-
sideration of the functions of the traditional family unit in contempo-
rary society and the cost to the state and its citizenry should the
family's influence be enervated or its content eviscerated.
This article focuses on identifying the unique functional quali-
ties of the traditional family unit, suggesting ways that states and
municipalities might humanly and humanely proceed to assure that
residential facilities are available to accommodate the needs of all
community members.
II. The Architectonics of Family
Comprehension of the dynamics of the family unit requires rec-
ognition and appreciation of a distinction between norms of composi-
tion and norms of association." Norms of composition denominate
the overt physio-centric attributes that culture expects of persons
who comprise the family unit. The prevailing norm of composition
characterizes a man (husband), a woman (wife), and their biological
children as a typical family."' Why is this a prevalent living
arrangement?
First we must answer that the culture permits it. It allows a
man and a woman to formalize their union in a socially pre-
scribed way; they are then socially authorized to have children.
Should they have children, they are then responsible, in this so-
ciety, for rearing them. Proceeding from this requirement, we
may then say that society not only permits the formation of
family groups but in fact generates considerable pressure toward
their formation because it prefers, even though it does not re-
quire, that people establish families."
A more generic description of the prevalent norm of composi-
tion might define a family as, "a small community composed of a
child and one or more adults in a close affective and physical relation
which is expected to endure at least through childhood. 26 While
22. 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984).
23. G. HANDEL, THE PSYCHO SOCIAL INTERIOR OF THE FAMILY, (2d 1972)[hereinafter
cited as HANDEL].
24. Id. at vii. See also J. B. ELSHTAIN, THE FAMILY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1982)[hereinafter cited as ELSHTAIN]; B. MALINOWSKI, FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION
(1960) [hereinafter cited as MALINOWSKI]; D. H. J. MORGAN, SOCIAL THEORY AND THE FAM-
ILY (1975)[hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; F. NYE, ROLE STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS OF THE
FAMILY (1976) [hereinafter cited as NYE].
25. HANDEL, supra note 23 at 108.
26. J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CON-
TROL 53 (1978).
myriad consensual living arrangements might meet this description,
few would be compatible with the experiences and expectations of
society.
Norms of association are those psycho-social perspectives which
permit, persuade, or require that individual members of a family re-
late to one another in defined ways. Custom and law contain the
parameters of acceptable social interaction in select relationships.
Moreover, the norms of association are formed of patent as well as
latent content. Disclosed lines of authority, the functional roles to be
filled, and the reciprocal obligations expected among members com-
prise the patent content. The personal and organizational value con-
structs expressed in the operations of integrated family units com-
prise latent content.
This is not to infer an immutability in the schemes of composi-
tion or association. Physical, moral, social, and economic forces de-
mand adaptation and variation. Individual participants, however, do
develop perceptions and expectations concerning usual relationships.
Furthermore, certain themes within kinship are mediated and mod-
erated through the various ideological structures and institutions ex-
tant in psycho-social existence. The resulting ideas and ideals shape
and define a social reality, and patterns of value stability and princi-
ples of legitimacy develop. Concurrently, patterns of social and polit-
ical stability evolve.2"
For example, an individual who enters a defined consensual re-
lationship such as marriage has probably assimilated certain tradi-
tional and consistent community perspectives concerning the mean-
ing of the relationship. Furthermore, such an individual will
probably transmit a facsimile of that value structure to persons sub-
ject to his influence.28 This archetypal phenomenon is a tendency to
form representations of a family motif, which though varying in de-
tail, retains its basic pattern.
[W]e all see, hear, smell, and taste many things without
noticing them at the time, either because our attention is de-
flected or because the stimulus to our senses is too slight to leave
27. MORGAN, supra note 24.
28.
The benefits of freedom which man derives from his domestic institution depend
upon the fact that all the manifold rules of common life are integrated into a
system. This system again is related to certain biological endowments of the
human organism, which supply the specific drive and psychological controls of
the culturally defined rules of creation and law. The family starts with marriage.
Under conditions of culture the attraction of sex is transformed into a social fact
by the Law of Marriage. There is not a single culture . . . where the permanent
cohabitation of men and women and legitimate procreation do not demand a
contract which defines the relations of husband and wife as well as parents and
children.
MALINOWSKI, supra note 24, at 116.
a conscious impression. The unconscious, however, has taken
note of them, and such subliminal sense perceptions play a sig-
nificant part in our everyday lives. Without realizing it, they in-
fluence the way we react to both events and people. 9
Courts grappling with the precept of family have tended to neg-
lect the interdependence of the focal standards. In deference to per-
sonal liberty, the nominal cynosure has been the elements of compo-
sition and, to a lesser extent, patent associational content. As a
result, courts occasionally have considered large, unigenerational,
unisexual groups that occupy a single unaltered dwelling unit and
that cook and eat together the functional equivalent of the family. so
The risks of such an open consensual definition are the degradation
of interests in privacy and the compression of liberty - all allegedly,
in the service of liberty.
Why might this occur? Evidence exists that within a particular
compositional motif, patent and latent associational content can vary
substantially without introducing instability into the unit. Con-
versely, minor change in composition necessitates significant altera-
tion in the norms of association with an attendant instability in the
social structure of which the unit is a part."' To fully appreciate the
equation, requires understanding of the function of families in our
culture.
29. C. JUNG, MAN AND His SYMBOLS 34 (1964).
There are many reasons why we forget things that we have noticed or ex-
perienced; and there are just as many ways in which they may be recalled to
mind. An interesting example is that of cryptomnesia, or "concealed recollec-
tion." An author may be writing steadily to a preconceived plan, working out an
argument or developing the line of a story, when he suddenly runs off at a tan-
gent. Perhaps a fresh idea has occurred to him, or a different image, or a whole
new sub-plot. If you ask him what prompted the digression, he will not be able
to tell you. He may not even have noticed the change, though he has now pro-
duced material that is entirely fresh and apparently unknown to him before. Yet
it can sometimes be shown convincingly that what he has written bears a strik-
ing similarity to the work of another author - a work that he believes he has
never seen.
I myself found a fascinating example of this in Nietzsche's book Thus
Spake Zarathustra, where the author reproduces almost word for word an inci-
dent reported in a ship's log for the year 1686. By sheer chance I had read this
seaman's yarn in a book published about L835 (half a century before Nietzsch
wrote); and when I found the similar passage in Thus Spake Zarathustra, I was
struck by its peculiar style, which was different from Nietzsche's usual language.
I was convinced that Nietzsche must also have seen the old book, though he
made no reference to it. I wrote to his sister, who was still alive, and she con-
firmed that she and her brother had in fact read the book together when he was
II years old. I think, from the context, it is inconceivable that Nietzsche had
any idea that he was plagiarizing this story. I believe that fifty years later it had
unexpectedly slipped into focus in his conscious mind.
H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973).
30. LaPorte v. City of New Rochelle, 2 A.D.2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956) (sixty
students in dormitory held single family use); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267
S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954).
31. HANDEL, supra note 23.
III. A Cultural Description of Family
The contemporary tendency in America is toward an open, mul-
tilineal conjugal family structure. The transitory and impersonal
character of an industrial occupational system places unique empha-
sis on the conjugal bond as an emotional counterinfluence. Conse-
quently, a key reference is the marital relationship between a man
and woman, accentuated by a preference for freedom in choosing a
mate. Further, the social and geographic mobility demanded by em-
ployment patterns militate against the dominance of an extended
family structure and in favor on the nuclear family. The residential
pattern is, therefore, neolocal.82
While an ethic favoring personal liberty in association has en-
couraged trends toward greater recognition of consensual relation-
ships, friendships, neighborhood ties, and kinship structures have not
been perceived as co-equal.
[W]hat we are suggesting is that friendship has tended to rest
on free choice and affectivity. Neighborhood ties, face to face
contact and, kinship structures, permanent relations. There is no
reason at any moment in time why all primary groups could not
overlap. However, the main point of the discussions is that there
are pressures in an industrial society for each of these groups to
separate.88
Accordingly, family bonds are not limited to conventional social
relationships but are perceived as relating to certain fundamental
processes. This is not to suggest a scheme of biological determinism,
but rather to acknowledge an overlap of biological facts and the so-
cial influences that cradle and cultivate propinquity.34 Sexual inti-
macy, the decision to cohabitate, marriage, procreation, adoption,
child-rearing, forms of holding property, and wealth distribution
through schemes of inter vivos retention or testamentary transmis-
sion of property (i.e., forms of patent content) combine to breathe
life into the concept of family. The unique association is punctuated
with moral claims and obligations, sentiment, reciprocity, demand,
dependence, and trust and cannot be dissolved by mere withdrawal
of consent. Kinship is a living relationship sustained through use.
IV. The Functions of Family
A family is a psycho-technical coalition founded upon ideas and
32. MORGAN, supra note 24; WESTIN, supra note 4.
33. E. LITWAK AND I. SZELENYI. Primary Group Structures and Their Functions: Kin,
Neighbors and Friends, reprinted in part in M. ANDERSON, SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
(1971).
34. MALINOWSKI, supra note 24; MORGAN, supra note 24.
ideals of authority, responsibility, and identification. It serves as:
1. an economic unit of production and consumption;
2. a vehicle for socialization of children; and
3. a vehicle of stabilization of the adult personality. 6
Through a process of bargaining and socialization, the unit dif-
ferentiates in order to fill cognizable roles and to perform necessary
indigenous functions. Notwithstanding pop culture, ample evidence
indicates that the notion is not sex dependent. As patent and latent
associational content need not be fixed, a particular function, over
time, may be performed by different individuals or, consistent with
the demands of the occasion, an individual may perform more than a
single role simultaneously.8s The concern is, therefore, with a differ-
entiation of function and the qualities of fulfillment by arrangement.
The issue is not one of specialization or disequalization of persons.
As an economic unit, the traditional family is often composed of
laboring and non-laboring individuals. Those with diminished labor
capacity, such as the very young, the very old, or the disabled, con-
tribute the values of affection, enlightenment, and rectitude to the
household. In reciprocation they are the beneficiaries of an intra-
family redistribution of the accessions of labor.
Others contribute labor power. This resource may be directed
inwardly to a production of imputed value to be consumed within the
economic unit. Alternatively, it may be directed outward to the pro-
duction of income to be returned to the family and shared by the
members.
For example, participants may grow their own food, build their
own shelter, and personally care for the dependency needs of certain
of their number. Alternatively, they may barter or sell their labor to
secure the resources with which to purchase goods and services.
While these nominal economic functions may appear to be freely
transferable between traditional families and other more loosely
structured groups, the latent associational content is not. Therefore,
dependency of an individual member upon one outside the unit for
support (for example, a social service agency) would necessarily alter
norms of association within the unit.17 The nature, source, and inten-
sity of the propensity to share values distinguishes a family from
other consensual associations. The legal, moral, and psycho-social
35. The relationship between family and the other components of society has been
diagrammatically expressed by N. BELL AND E. VOGEL, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE
FAMILY 10 (1968), as follows:
36. MORGAN, supra note 24; NYE, supra note 24.
37. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); See
Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981).
prescriptions that promote the recognition in family of an obligation
to cooperate vary markedly from the perspectives of free, voluntary,
and episodic decisions to contribute to collective welfare.3 8 Family
connotes duty, reciprocity, and a claim to performance. 9
The consequences of a decrease in the marginal value of individ-
ual labor units as a result of the realignment of living arrangements
will not receive extended discussion.40 Assessment of the risks of
such an effect on residential character would, however, be propitious.
Should individuals of independent financial capacities combine re-
sources to purchase living space, the marginal cost of single-dwell-
ings could rise to meet the increasing capacity. A market for consen-
sual living arrangements may thus adversely effect the market for
traditional living arrangements. Were this to occur, the traditional
single family might become even less able to afford a traditional sin-
gle-family dwelling. Competition between the physical arrangements
might reduce the availability of single family dwellings and/or alter
the norms of association of family by inducing outward expression of
labor power, converting domestic labor to external labor or forcing
non-laboring persons to assume a laboring role. Any of the conse-
quences might cause a shift in focus to economic concern at the ex-
pense of psycho-social values.
Such was the concern in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. 5 Ap-
pellants' brief noted that four independent students living in a con-
sensual arrangement could, as a group, afford to pay more for a
given space than could a traditional family with a single wage
earner.
V. Psycho-Social Development
Within the socialization-interaction process there are two inte-
38.
The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is . . . contained in the
ethical substantial order, since particularity is the outward appearance of the
ethical order - a mode in which the order is existent.
Hence in this identity of the universal will with the particular will, right
and duty coalesce, and by being in the ethical order, a man has rights in so far
as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights.
The ethical substance, as containing independent self-consciousness united
with its concept, is the actual mind of a family...
HEGEL, supra note 20, at 1 154-156.
39.
Culture bases its decrees on innate tendencies and transforms these latter into
rules sanctioned also by an organized vigilance of the community. In saying this
we do not personify culture but merely state the universal facts of . . . social
organization. We must also realize that human cultures, like any other evolu-
tionary phenomena, are subject to the laws of competition and those of the sur-
vival of the strongest forms or organization.
MALINOWSKI, supra note 24 at 117.
40. ELSHTAIN, supra note 24, at 199.
41. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
gral functions: the individuation of the person; and internalization of
culture as it is mediated through the nuclear family.
While human nature may not be biologically fixed, neither is it
a mere shadow of cultural patterns. It is a product of historical bio-
social evolution. The factors influencing development are generally
classified within one of three groups. First are those strivings and
character traits by which persons differ from one another. These are
malleable, show elasticity, and develop as a reaction to life condi-
tions. They include a capacity for compassion or a lust for power; an
integrated sense of self worth or a desire for self aggrandizement; a
propensity toward selfless action or a passion for thrift; an enjoyment
of sexual pleasure or a fear of sensuality. The distribution and expe-
rience of select features are particularly susceptible to the influence
of the environment into which the individual is thrust upon birth.
Second are those needs which find root in physiological organi-
zation. Third is the gregarious need to be related to the outside envi-
ronment and to avoid the loneliness of independence. 42 In a utilita-
rian sense, man needs co-operation to provide for adequate defense
and to work for self-preservation. Much of this has been described as
an economic role of the family. In addition, through his subjective
self conscious (that is the faculty of thinking by which man is made
aware of himself and consequently his separation from nature and
other human beings) he gains a sense of insignificance. "To feel
completely alone and isolated leads to mental disintegration just as
physical starvation leads to death.' 3 As described most forcefully in
the following passage from La Comkdie Humaine: Illusions Perdues,
by Honor6 De Balzac:
Now, learn this; carve it on that soft brain of yours: man has a
horror of solitude. And of all solitudes, moral solitude is that
which terrifies him most. The first hermits lived with God; they
inhabited the most populous of worlds,-the spiritual world. Mi-
sers inhabit a world of fancy and possession; a miser has all,
even his sex, in his brain. The first desire of man, be he a leper
or a galley-slave, infamous or diseased, is to have a sharer in his
fate. To satisfy that desire, which is existence itself to him, he
employs his whole strength, his every faculty, the very sap of his
life.4'
42. E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941)[hereinafter cited as FROMM]; See also
E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963); MALINOWSKI supra note 24.
43. FROMM, supra note 42, at 34.
44. H. DE BALZAC, LA COMtDIE HUMAINE 381 (Wormeley ed. 1896). For a different
translation providing additional insight, see THE NOVELS OF BALZAC, LOST ILLUSIONS 347
(Centenary edition):
But, learn this, carve it on that still so soft brain of yours - man dreads to be
alone. And of all kinds of isolation, inward isolation is the most appalling. The
early anchorite lived with God; he dwelt in the spirit world, the most populous
Unless an individual can find coalescence in the formation of a
group family bond, he risks being overcome by this diminution of
self.45
A. Ontogenesis
Upon birth a child becomes physically separate and individu-
ated from his mother, yet the two remain functionally a single unit
for a considerable period. He is fed, carried, and taken care of; func-
tionally, the umbilical cord is not severed. Initially, the child is una-
ble to differentiate himself from his parents, and in this ignorance
the personality finds security. Simultaneously, the neonate is viewed
psychologically as a possession of the family. The reciprocal sense of
belonging characteristic of this stage of development (prior to
psychic individuation) is indispensable to a later capacity to relate
successfully to a social environment.46
Self-love or narcissism works toward the preservation of the in-
dividual, but the aggression which is indigenous to such an emotion
vanishes in the family. The child learns to identify with family struc-
ture and the individuals who compose the unit. A reason for this
alteration is the phenomenon of libidinal bond formation. "Love of
one's self knows only one barrier-love for others, love for objects."47
Love fosters a change from egoism to altruism, and the libido "at-
taches itself to the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and chooses
as its first object the people who share in that process. And in the
development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone
world of all. The miser lives in a world of imagination and fruition; his whole life
and all that he is, even his sex, lies in the brain. A man's first thought, be he
leper or convict, hopelessly sick or degraded, is to find another with a like fate to
share it with him. He will exert the utmost that is in him, every power, all his
vital energy, to satisfy that craving; it is his very life. But for that tyrannous
longing, would Satan have found companions? There is a whole poem yet to be
written, a first part of Paradise Lost; Milton's poem is only the apology for the
revolt.
45. See FROMM, supra note 42. See also E. JONES, THE LIFE AND AND WORK OF
SIGMUND FREUD 341 (1968), quoting S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, THE
MAJOR WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 778, 780 (1952)[hereinafter cited as FREUD,
DISCONTENTS]:
The substitution of the power of a united number for the power of a single man
is the decisive step towards civilization. The essence of it lies in the circumstance
that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratifi-
cation, whereas the individual recognizes no such restrictions. The first requisite
of a culture, therefore, is Justice, that is, the assurance that a law once made
will not be broken in favor of any individual.
46. See C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1957); J.
FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY (1945); FREUD, DISCONTENTS, supra note 45; S.FREUD,
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (1971)[hereinafter cited as FREUD, GROUP
PSYCHOLOGY]; H. MARCUSE, ENDS AND CIVILIZATION (1955); P. ROAZIN, FREUD: POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL THOUGHT (1968); THE NEW STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD (J. Strachey, ed. 1953); K. HORNEY, NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1966).
47. FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 46, at 43.
acts as the civilizing factor."4 8
There are, in fact, two libidinal bonds; namely object cathexis
and identification. Object cathexis is what one would like to have;
identification is what one would like to be. The former can be ob-
served in normal love relations; the latter in affective alliance. Object
cathexis, inhibited in its aim, is the tie which binds child to parent,
the prime political unit. Identification can become "a substitute for
libidinal object tie as it were by means of introjection of the object
into the ego; and it may arise with any new perception of a common
quality shared with some person who is not an object of the sexual
instinct. '4 9 Such is the force binding siblings and larger con-
stituences. During this development the family mediates the impact
of social values upon the individual.
Thus the mode of life, as it is determined for the individual
by the peculiarity of an economic (or political) system, becomes
the primary factor in determining his whole character structure,
because the imperative need for self preservation forces him to
accept the conditions under which he has to live ....
[Pirimarily his personality is molded by the particular mode of
life, as he has already been confronted with it as a child through
the medium of the family, which represents all the features that
are typical of a particular society .... 1o
The family is not, however, isolated. It is linked to a larger sys-
tem through the social contacts of its members. Eventually, through
biological maturation and mental enlightenment, the child finds him-
self leaning less on the authority of his parents (to be differentiated
from a regressive reliance upon authority which may appear later in
the life cycle). That which was begun in the family is perfected in
society." The more a child grows stronger physically, emotionally,
and mentally, the greater his quest for total independence and free-
dom from the restraining parental bonds; and each of these spheres
becomes both internally as well as externally more active and
integrated.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id. at 49.
50. FROMM, supra note 42, at 33.
51.
To the present generation of historical and political writers it has become in-
creasingly clear that people not only seek their interests but also express and
even in a measure define themselves in politics; that political life acts as a sound-
ing board for identities, values, fears and aspirations. . .. I have no interest in
denying the reality or even the primacy of the problems of money and power,
but only in helping to define their reality by turning attention to the human
context in which they arise and in which they have settled.
R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS: IX-X
(1965).
An organized structure guided by the individual's will and rea-
son develops. . . . The limits of the growth of individuation and
the self are set, partly by individual conditions (heredity), but
essentially by social conditions . . . . For although the differ-
ences between individuals in this respect appear to be great,
every society is characterized by a certain level of individuation
beyond which the normal individual cannot go.s2
The family experience is not, however, uni-dimensional. Parents
and siblings also experience psychological and physical disruption
and attendant growth. Interaction of family members serves cogni-
tive, cathectic, and evaluative goals. Adjustment to the event of birth
and orientation to the growth process contribute to the ultimate
unique stability of the family structure. Parents are able to interact
with children. They have an opportunity to experience love, duty,
nurturing, jealousy, constraints of time, altruism, feelings of mortal-
ity and immortality, and life and death, all within a defined, stable,
and relatively secure construct. Further, they are able to act out
child-like or childish elements in their personalities in a legitimate
setting. Because parents are able to combine elements of duty and
pleasure, the family is a vehicle of continued growth for and stabili-
zation of the adult personality."
The question arises to what extent this process of socialization
depends upon the institution of the nuclear family. Responses are
value-contingent and rest on individual notions of cognition, emotion,
morality, and social and political preference. A substantial consensus
holds, however, that the nuclear family functions differently from
other groups, and that it has had a profound influence on the evolu-
tion of American society.
The important point is the near universality of the limitation of
52. Id. at 44.
53. For another perspective advocating the abolition of the family and the take-over of
child rearing by the state, see K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
427 (50 Great Books ed. 1950):
Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal
of the Communists.
On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family based? On
Capital, or private gain. ...
The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement
vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of Capital.
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their
parents? To this crime we plead guilty.
But, you will say, we destroy ;the most hallowed of relations when we re-
place home education by social. ...
The Communists have not innovated the intervention of society in educa-
tion; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention ....
The bourgeois clap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-
relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, by the action of
modern society.
See also MORGAN, supra note 24, at 33.
variability to such narrow limits both with respect to function
and to structural type (of living arrangement). Why is not initial
status-ascription made on the basis of an assessment of individ-
ual organic and personality traits? Why is not all child care and
responsibility sometimes placed in the hands of specialized or-
gans just as formal education is? Why is not the regulation of
sexual relations divorced from the responsibility for child-care
and status-ascription? Why are kinship units not patterned like
industrial organizations? It is, of course, by no means excluded
that fundamental changes in any or all of these respects may
sometimes come about. But the very fact that they have not yet
done so in spite of the very wide variability of known social sys-
tems in other respects is none the less a fact of considerable
importance."'
As a small sexually diverse, intergenerational, bio-sociological
group, the family is perceived as playing a distinctive and original
role in ontogenesis. It serves not only to nurture its members, but
also, through identification, as a paradigm of neighborhood.
B. Phylogenesis
The relationship between society and the family is equiparant
and interdependent. The norms of association that develop between
child and parent are transported, transposed, inculcated, and ex-
pressed in the relationship of population to polity. Phylogenesis sig-
nificantly follows and depends upon critical ontogenesis.
From the communal child-rearing in Plato's Republic to the test
tube nurseries in Huxley's Brave New World, the replacement of
the family with some alternative strategy of child-rearing has
been the centerpiece of any social engineering that required
complete manipulation of human development. As long as the
private sphere of liberty is in place, crucial developmental fac-
tors are entrusted to the autonomous decisions of families and
are, by that very fact, insulated from social control. Whether the
efforts at social engineering are aimed at equalization or hierar-
chy, the family constitutes a crucial barrier to the manipulabil-
ity of the causal factors affecting human development. 5
The significance of housing patterns on this design should not be
underestimated. When an individual seeks a dwelling unit in a single
family environment a reasonable expectation is that occupancy will
permit participation in a traditional neighborhood value structure.
The desire is to share common experiences, dreams, and goals, and
thereby fulfill the need for identification. The concept of family,
54. T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 155 (1964).
55. FISHKIN, supra note 4 at 65.
therefore, extends beyond the physical bounds of property and into
the psycho-social eidolon of neighborhood. The introduction of cer-
tain consensual living arrangements through application of a noncrit-
ical definition of family could lead to a destabilization of traditional
family values and ultimately a subtle weakening of the social and
political bonds of the state.
VII. The Judicial Vista
The Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,56 rec-
ognized the validity of land use in support of family values and fam-
ily residential patterns. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
stated:
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses and the like
present urban problems. More people occupy a given space;
more cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are parked,
noise travels with crowds. A quiet place where yards are wide,
people few and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guide-
lines in a land use project addressed to family needs."7
Justice Douglas did not, however, confine his perceptions to
mere physical characteristics. The Court's concept of public welfare
is not so narrow. "The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary."5 Justice Douglas contin-
ued: "The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family val-
ues, youth values and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people."59
Justice Powell in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,60 described
the relatively consistent view of the family held by the Supreme
Court: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family
is rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It is through the fam-
ily that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished val-
ues, moral and cultural."61
As a result of the rather unwavering perspective of the Supreme
Court and the perception that the concerns of community should be
the subject of local initiative and accommodation, the focus on devel-
oping images of residential use has, in recent years, shifted to the
states and municipalities. Due to the diversity of values involved and
56. 416 U.S. 1(1974)
57. Id. at 9.
58. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
59. 416 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
60. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
61. Id. at 503-04.
the complexity and variety of living arrangements at issue, no consis-
tent or uniform solutions have appeared.
The point of departure has been, however, the concept of resi-
dential zoning, the essence of which demands a competent definition
of family. This is not to infer that family residential use should be
equated to or treated as synonymous or co-extensive with other
forms of residential living. Indeed, some of the greatest difficulties
have arisen when the varied qualities of residential life were ignored
and no attempt was made to identify the myriad values and facts
inherent in and expressed by varied living arrangements.6"
The numerous state schemes find classification in one of the fol-
lowing five categories or a permutation or combination thereof.
1. A family residential area is reserved by municipal ordi-
nance with no explicit definition of family provided.63
2. A family residential area is reserved by municipal ordi-
nance with family defined as individuals living together and re-
lated by blood, marriage or adoption."'
3. A family residential area is reserved by municipal ordi-
nance with family defined as a single housekeeping unit.6
4. A family residential area is reserved by municipal ordi-
nance with a definition of family provided; however, the defini-
tion is superseded in select circumstances by municipal ordi-
nance or state legislation.66
5. A family residential area is reserved, with or without de-
fining family, with judicial interpretation of the state constitu-
62. 71 A.L.R. 3d 693 (1976). See generally 2 WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
52.01 (1974)[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS].
63. See Riverside v. Reagan, 270 Ill. App. 355, (1933); Stafford v. Incorporated Village
of Sands Point, 200 Misc. 57, 102 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Sullivan v. Anglo-American
Inv. Trust Inc., 89 N.H. 112, 193 A. 225 (1937); Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Syanon
Found. Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1965).
64. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); City of
Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961); Roundup Found., Inc. v. Board
of Adj., 626 P.2d. 1154 (Colo. App. 1980); Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of
Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981); White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449, 313 N.E.2d 756 (1974); Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I11. App. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116
(1966). But see 24 ILL. ANN. STAT. I 11-13-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982 Supp.); Region IV Client
Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980).
65. Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981); Theta Kappa, Inc. v.Terre
Haute, 141 Ind. App. 165, 226 N.E.2d 907 (1967)(fraternity house with fifty-nine members
not a family); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954)(twenty nurses
in residence considered family); Neptune Park Assoc. v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d
687 (1951); Carroll v. Arlington County, 185 Va. 575, 44 S.E.2d 6 (1947)(woman living alone
in a house with servants found to be one housekeeping unit).
66. City of Los Angeles v. California State Dep't of Health, 63 Cal.App.3d 473, 133
Cal. Rptr. 771 (Ct. App. 1977); Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872
(Colo. 1983); Adams County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Westminster, 580 P.2d 1246
(Colo. 1978); State ex rel. Thelen v. City of Missoula, 168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975);
Brandon Township v. North-Oakland Residential Serv., Inc., 110 Mich. App. 300, 312
N.W.2d 238 (1981); Malcolm v. Shanie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. App.
1980). But see Garcia v. Siffrin, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1969).
tion rejecting restrictive definitions.67
Many of the cases have been collated and analyzed elsewhere."
Notwithstanding, certain observations may be offered. First, the de-
cisions are inconsistent. The more specific the definition of family,
however, the more courts have felt constrained in interpretation and
application.
Second, while a number of courts have made a limited attempt
to identify the functional qualities of family, most do not look be-
yond the most superficial patent associational content. The more ex-
trinsic the perception, the more permissive the interpretation. The
more indiscriminate the interpretation, the greater the difficulty in
successive cases with varied and disparate facts.
Third, courts seem to be haunted by an irreconcilable tension
between securing factor endowments 9 and vindicating egalitarian
claims.70 Peculiar to this dilemma is an acknowledged social respon-
sibility, derived from the concept of family, to provide adequate care
for the less fortunate members of the community. The resulting am-
bivalence often results in judicial and intellectual analytical
paralysis.
Fourth, in adjudicating individual controversies, courts often
weigh the common duty of government to care for all its citizenry
against the parochial interest of a particular property owner or
neighborhood. Lost is the general cultural interest in preserving the
integrity of a family environment for the benefit of society. Accord-
ingly, the burden of mediating and vindicating social claims is im-
posed on small private units.
Fifth, judicial contests are by their nature episodic and adver-
sarial. Due to the retrospectivity of the process and the focus on ad-
judicative facts, the judicial operation is not well suited to the pro-
duction of statements of policy of general prospective application.71
Further, continued resort to the judicial system promotes competitive
behavior at the expense and often to the exclusion of cooperative
action.7 1 When persons perceive themselves as confronted with con-
67. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
68. For a typical article promoting advocating techniques, see Lappincott, A Sanctuary
for People; Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Re-
tarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1979). See also 71 A.L.R. 3d 693 (1976); WILLIAMS,
supra note 62 at 52.01. For an interesting linguistic analysis of family, see Brussack, Gray
homes, Families and Meaning in the Law of Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV. 33
(1981-82).
69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71. C.f. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 198, 203 (1947). See also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1972).
72. A study of perception of staff roles in community residential facilities found that:
When respondents (staff of facilities) Were specifically asked to state their
training responsibilitues, the majority (65.9%) indicated encouraging residents'
flict, they draw their resources around them; their instincts turn to
self-preservation. They are, customarily, less altruistic, less humani-
tarian, less beneficent and less humane. Actually, the judicial process
could not operate absent this egocentric attitude. Unfortunately, the
threat of judicial action has been used by advocates as a bludgeon to
intimidate.
In many communities, lines of interaction that could be used to
promote positive long term goals have been broken and funds that
might have been better spent on programs of education of the com-
munity or service to the disabled are wasted on incontinent adjudica-
tion. Therefore, to the extent that decisions adequately analyze the
functions of a particular living arrangement and match those with
the quality of the existing environment through applications of a de-
veloped, cogent and articulated theory, they contribute to a strong
comprehensible social fabric. To the extent that analysis or con-
tinuity are deficient, the social fabric is torn.
A. The New York Experience
An example demonstrating the difficulties encountered by a
court juggling inconsistent social goals while attempting to articulate
intelligent legal theory can be found by examining New York case
law.
In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,78 the issue was whether a
group home consisting of a married couple and their two children
and ten foster children was permissible in an area designated for
single family units. "Family" was defined by the applicable ordi-
nance as one or more persons limited to the spouse, parents, grand-
parents, grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers, or sisters of the
owner or the tenant or of the owner's spouse or the tenant's spouse
capacity for independent living as a primary training activity. Other frequently
mentioned areas included the development of resident self-care skills and the
encouragement of residents' ability for self-direction. Examples in the miscella-
neous category included: scheduling, advocacy, program development and imple-
mentation, and basic household maintenance.
Respondents' knowledge of basic training technology concepts was minimal.
Less than 50% of the respondents correctly defined or provided examples of the
basic training concepts listed with one exception: 62.2% provided correct exam-
ples of punishment. No respondent was able to identify all eight components of
an individual habilitation plan (IHP) as contained in Public Law 95-602 (1978).
Thirty-eight percent identified one to four components of an IHP. In contrast to
knowledge of basic training technology skills, over 55% of the respondents cor-
rectly defined advocacy. Eighty-six percent provided appropriate examples of ad-
vocacy responsibilities they had performed for their residents such as identifying,
locating, and enrolling residents in appropriate community service programs.
Slater & Bunyard, Survey of Residential Staff Roles, Responsibilities,and Perception of Resi-
dent Needs, 21 MENTAL RETARDATION 52, 55 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Slater & Bunyard,
Survey].
73. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 756 (1974).
living together as a single housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities.
Provision was also made in the zoning ordinance to permit up to two
roomers and to accommodate other uses including welfare and phil-
anthropic institutions.74 Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the Court of
Appeals, opined that while the goals of single-family living were le-
gitimate and a municipality could limit the uses in residential areas
to single-family units, it might be too restrictive to require that
members of a family be related by marriage, consanguinity or adop-
tion. He concluded that "so long as the group home bears the ge-
neric character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household,
and is not a framework for transients or transient living, it conforms
to the purpose of the ordinance. '
Four years later the court was confronted with a similar yet
more expansive issue in Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v.
Board of Zoning and Appeals of The Town of North Hempstead.
Judge Gabrielli, writing for the court, concluded that a group home
created to house unadopted disturbed children was to be considered
the functional equivalent or a family. It therefore met the definition
of family, provided by the municipal ordinance, as "one or more per-
sons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, residing . . . as a single
housekeeping unit.""17 The court emphasized that the decision was to
be limited to its facts and inferred that were the home to provide
care for the delinquent or the mentally disturbed, a different result
might be reached. Chief Judge Breitel did not join the majority. In a
separate dissenting opinion he noted:
[T]he proposed Port Washington home in key respects differs
from a traditional family. Instead of one married couple, two
alternating sets of persons, not specified as to sex or marital sta-
tus are to be employed as "houseparents," one set for weekdays
and the other set for weekends and holidays. Nor does it appear
that the children could be effectively integrated into the commu-
nity, assuming, dubiously, that that was intended. The goal of
the home, and that of the psychiatric treatment given, is that
the youngsters be returned to their own parents as soon as possi-
ble. . . .As opposed to a "relatively permanent" household, the
framework of the Group House allows for, if it does not pro-
mote, the housing of transients. Indeed, the more successful the
enterprise, the greater the movement in and out of the home.78
Notwithstanding the Chief Judge's participation in Ferraioli, in
which the technique of statutory interpretation was utilized to per-
74. Id. at 305, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451, 313 N.E.2d at 757.
75. Id. at 305-06, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453, 313 N.E.2d at 758.
76. 45 N.Y.2d 266, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 N.E.2d 207 (1978).
77. Id. at 271, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 380 N.E.2d at 208 (two boarders also permitted).
78. Id. at 275-76, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 382, 380 N.E.2d at 212.
mit operation of a large foster home, Judge Breitel was disturbed in
Port Washington, "by an evasive process, to stretch the liberal inter-
pretation to still another and even more liberal application. .... ,,79
In conclusion, the Chief Judge expressed concern for the future
of the single-family form of living:
While any number of homes designed to conform practically
with a community zoned for single-family homes should not be
objectionable, a like number of homes resembling the Port
Washington facility could, perhaps irreversibly, undermine the
stability and tranquil atmosphere to which the majority opinion
refers in discussing the Belle Terre case.80
Finally, and as a sequel to the debate on this issue within the
Court of Appeals, the court in New York v. St. Agatha Home for
Children81 held that a state law requiring counties to establish non-
secure detention facilities for young offenders authorized, sub silen-
tio, the creation of privately operated facilities in single-family resi-
dential areas. Further, the court concluded that a county decision to
permit such facilities could not be overruled by a local zoning ordi-
nance. Of interest is that Judge Breitel was no longer a member of
the court and Judge Gabrielli joined in the decision, notwithstanding
his expressed concern with permitting detention homes in single-fam-
ily residential area. The cases exemplify the difficulties which courts
encounter when functioning in a void of efficacious and perfected
policy.
B. The Pennsylvania Experience
The Pennsylvania courts have assumed a rather temperate pos-
ture on the use of a single-family dwelling by a nontraditional unit.
While the judicial lodestar has expectedly been patent association
content, the decisions evince respect for traditional family functions.
The germinal case on the subject is Children's Aid Society v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment.82 There, the petitioner sought to utilize a de-
tached single-family dwelling as a residence for a couple and six fos-
ter children. Since the individuals who would use the dwelling did
not constitute a family under the applicable zoning ordinance, the
Children's Aid Society requested a use certificate as a charitable in-
stitution. The Zoning Board denied the application on the grounds
that the Society had not met its burden of proof under Section 14-
1803(1)(d) of the applicable Philadelphia Zoning Ordinance. The
79. Id. at 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 380 N.E.2d at 213.
80. Id. at 276, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 283-83, 380 N.E.2d at 212.
81. 47 N.Y.2d 46, 416 N.Y.S.2d 577, 389 N.E.2d 1098 (1979)(per curiam).
82. 44 Pa. Commw.-Ct. 23, 402 A.2d 1162 (1979).
qualities explicated in the ordinance were predominantly physical,
and the type of certificate at issue would have been issued in ordi-
nary course absent facts that the application would prove injurious
to the articulated public interest. The Commonwealth Court found
uncontroverted evidence that the physical use of dwelling would be
identical to that which would exist were the property utilized by a
traditional family with six children, and therefore, met the demands
of the ordinance. The court explicitly noted that it was not necessary
to evaluate the case on constitutional grounds, and did not discuss
the qualities of family life.
Lakeside Youth Services v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper
Moreland" was the first in a series of cases which addressed the
quality of life internal to the proposed unit. In declining to permit a
home for delinquent young females in court custody within a single-
family residential zone, the Commonwealth Court concluded:
The record shows that Lakeside's home would accommodate six
adjudicated young women referred by the courts; that the aver-
age stay for each subject would be six months to a year and that
after that period if all went well she would be transferred to, as
Lakeside's principal witness pointed out, an "even more home-
like" situation. In addition to live-in houseparents and a perma-
nent daytime support staff of caseworkers, the six young women
would be regularly visited by a psychologist and psychia-
trist. . . . (I)n view of the transient nature of the principal resi-
dents the basic social structure of the proposed use is simple too
far removed from the . . . concept of "single-family
dwelling". ...4
The first Pennsylvania case to address the constitutionality of
restricting occupancy of a single-family dwelling to persons related
by blood or marriage was Children's Home of Easton v. City of
Easton. 5 In holding the ordinance unconstitutional as applied the
Commonwealth Court found that a unit consisting of three foster
children, foster parents and their two natural children was a family.
The uncontradicted testimony indicated that the foster family was
functionally similar to a natural family. The court noted certain
equivalents:
There would be no professional counselors involved, nor any
"days off" for the foster parents. The "hope" would be that the
foster children would remain in the home until after graduation
from high school. The foster parents would be expected to pro-
vide all the services that would be expected from natural par-
83. 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. 485, 414 A.2d 1115 (1980).
84. Id. at 489, 414 A.2d at 1116.
85. 53 Pa. Commw. Ct 216, 417 A.2d 830 (1980).
ents. They would serve in a "nurturing, supervisory and caring
role." In sum, the foster parents in this instance would be the
functional equivalent of a biologically related family.86
The scope of the decision, however, is telling: it reaffirms the
necessity of examining the content and purpose of the applicable or-
dinance as well as the details of the proposed residential use to ascer-
tain their compatibility. Significantly, the only state interest asserted
by the City of Easton in restricting use to related individuals was
that of population density control.
A similar ordinance defining a family as one or more persons
related by blood, adoption, or marriage was determined to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to a husband and wife living in leased premises
with three mentally-retarded children in Hopkins v. Zoning Hearing
Board of Abington Township.87 The court again considered the ex-
ternal functional qualities of the subject group and observed that the
use of the property had not actually caused any problems different
from those caused by families with related children. "Here, Appel-
lees seek to set up a family life as nearly normal as possible with
their three handicapped children in their care. Appellees' use of the
property is consciously striving to mirror the residential family life
that surrounds them. .. "8 The court delicately balanced the
needs of a traditional family setting and the state interest in provid-
ing for its disabled citizens. Conspicuously absent was a discussion of
two seminal features. First, the particular community living arrange-
ment was part of a program developed by the State of Pennsylvania
to place persons disabled by mental retardation into a family setting.
Second, the nature of the relationship was essentially proprietary;
one of the appellees was hired to serve as a house parent. It is appar-
ent from the decision that the size and stability of the unit persuaded
the court that to apply a biological standard would present an unrea-
sonable burden to the parties. The decision did not address the possi-
ble preemption of local initiative by state policy in favor of commu-
nity living.
A number of the questions that relpained in Hopkins were ven-
tilated in In Re Appeal of Theresa McGinnis.89 Ms. McGinnis pur-
chased a residentially zoned property in 1979 and, together with five
elderly persons, began inhabiting the property shortly thereafter.
The relevant zoning ordinance permitted occupancy of a single-fam-
ily dwelling by persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption; or by
86. Id. at 219-20, 417 A.2d at 832 (emphasis added).
87. 55 Pa. Commw. Ct. 365, 423 A.2d 1082 (1980).
88. Id. at 369, 423 A.2d at 1084.
89. 68 Pa. Commw. Ct. 57, 448 A.2d 108 (1982) cert. den. sub nom. McGinnis v. Lang-
horne Manor Borough, . U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2121 (1983).
a group, not in excess of five members, who live together in a single
nonprofit unit and who maintain a common household. Ms. McGin-
nis claimed that the ordinance restricting use to traditional families
was unconstitutional. The court, citing Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,90 held that "no persuasive reason has been offered why a
municipality . . . may not constitutionally prohibit the cohabitation
of six unrelated older persons."9 The living arrangements in McGin-
nis, unlike those in Hopkins and Children's Home of Easton, em-
bodied no permanent commitment on the part of the residents:
Each resident is free to leave at any time unfettered by the
legal, social and moral bonds-including those bonds created,
for example, by a commitment to the task of child rearing-that
import greater stability to nuclear families. In sum, each of
these cases must turn on its facts and, with the exception of age
of the residents, the living arrangement here involved is very
much like that of Belle Terre and unlikely to be mistaken for a
nuclear family. 92
Further, overwhelming evidence showed that the arrangement
possessed a commercial flavor incompatible with single-family resi-
dential character. Occupants were charged a daily rate which varied
according to the services provided. A nurse's services were included.
The- operation was described as a residential home and was treated
as a business for federal income tax purposes. Included among the
deductions were advertising expenses, depreciation, licenses, wages,
and repairs. These, of course, would be unavailable to a usual tax-
payer consuming as opposed to investing in housing services.
Finally, that the services provided were in accord with state-
ments of policy attributed to the Commonwealth Department of Ag-
ing did not influence the court: "[T]he issue is not whether Ms. Mc-
Ginnis ought to be permitted to carry on her useful vocation but
whether it is within the power of the municipality to exclude com-
mercial activities from residential zones." 93
The most recent judicial activity in this arena is Owens v. Zon-
ing Hearing Board of Norristown.94 The Commonwealth Court held
that a boarding house occupied by seven unrelated adults who par-
ticipated in Norristown's State Hospital's day treatment program
could constitutionally be excluded from single and two-family resi-
dential areas. The court concluded that the for-profit commercial en-
deavor was unsuited to the values of family life notwithstanding its
90. 416 U.S. 1 (1982).
91. 68 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 66, 448 A.2d at 112.
92. Id. 67, n.2, 448 A.2d at 113, n.2.
93. Id. at 70, 448 A.2d at 114.
94. 79 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 468 A2d. 1195 (1983).
connection with state goals of rehabilitation.
VIII. The Legislative Initiatives
In an attempt to resolve a number of the difficulties of residen-
tial placement of disabled citizens, several states have promulgated
statutes defining certain community living arrangements as single-
family uses, notwithstanding zoning ordinances to the contrary .11
An articulated purpose of the legislature is to vitiate the negative
stereotype of incapacitated persons to secure to that class reasonable
benefits of habilitation.96 In the process, however, legislatures merely
replaced one stereotype with another. The new presumption is that
occupation of a dwelling unit by the designated number of individu-
als will create the essential equivalent to a family. Such legislation
may be deficient in one of four ways, however.
First, classification on the basis of numbers of occupants is arbi-
trary, overbroad, and not rationally related to the legitimate state
goals of providing competent housing services to the handicapped
while simultaneously securing reasonable residential areas to the
general population. While density is an important feature in evaluat-
ing the qualities of family life, it is certainly not the delimiting defi-
nitional factor. 97 Any cogent theory of family must be sensitive to
the myriad indicies of value content. Family is not an oceanic feeling
but a precious and detailed social rudiment. Preservation of its form
is indispensable to any program of habilitation in which normaliza-
tion is a goal and traditional social structures are the models toward
which it aspires.
Second, the number of residents permitted, usually between six
and twelve exclusive of staff, is substantially higher that is tradition-
ally found in comparable dwelling units.9" Such high density not
only diminishes the capacity of the arrangement to provide the em-
blements of family life to the residents, but also distinguishes it from
other "families" in the neighborhood with which it might otherwise
identify. The increased density frustrates the internal and external
integration of the members.
Third, insofar as concentration of living arrangements rest upon
considerations of cost efficiency, they neither serve the best interest
of the clients nor the neighborhoods into which they are placed.
Last, these statutes demonstrate a failure to appreciate the na-
95. See MICH. STAT. ANN. 5.2963 (16a)(2)(Callaghan 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-
23-301(4) (1977 Repl. Vol. 12).
96. Adams Co. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Westminster, 196 Colo. 79, 580 P.2d
1246 (1978).
97. E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1969).
98. See supra note 95.
ture and extent of the proposed residents' disabilities.99 Some citi-
zens suffer from social ills and such a facility would serve a low se-
curity detention function or as a vehicle to reintegrate such persons
into the mainstream of social life. Others are physically, mentally, or
emotionally devitalized, needing specialized care or rehabilitative
services. Still others are in need because of disintegration of their
primary family unit. Each group has unique requirements. Nothing
short of a tailored cooperative community effort will adequately sat-
isfy each group's essential demands. Actually, a community residen-
tial facility (CRF) might be neither the least restrictive"' nor most
normalizing environment for a particular individual.
A. Restrictiveness
For example, principles of meaningful freedom for retarded and
other persons may be substantially different:
[H]ow do we determine "restrictiveness"? It may be naive to
assume that the most "normative" setting is necessarily the least
for everyone. What feels restrictive to one person may feel un-
constraining to another. A wheelchair is a restriction to an am-
bulatory person, but it provides increased freedom to a paraple-
gic. The problem is especially complicated for persons suffering
sensory or cognitive impairment. A setting which provides free-
dom to a nonhandicapped person may be more restrictive to a
handicapped person than a specially designed prosthetic environ-
ment. And the problem is more complicated still when the least
restrictive alternative test is applied to the larger social environ-
ment in which a retarded person lives as opposed to facilities
designed for specific programs. A small group home nestled in a
hostile neighborhood, even if honorifically labeled as "commu-
nity care," or a place "in the community," may be considerably
more restrictive to its residents than a small village-type facility
in which retarded residents are full participants in their own
"community," even if some might call that community an "insti-
tution." The ultimate complexity of the least-restrictive alterna-
99. See generally, Briefs for Amici Curiae Congress of Advocates for the Retarded,
Inc., and American Psychiatric Association, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder-
man, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984). See also A. BAUMEISTER & E. BUTTERFIELD, RESIDENTIAL FACIL-
ITIES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1970); M. BEGAB & S. RICHARDSON, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED AND SOCIETY: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975)[hereinafter cited as BEGAB
& RICHARDSON]; 1-3 RESEARCH TO PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION (Mittler ed. 1977);
Dalgleish, Assessment of Residential Environments for Mentally Retarded Adults in Britain,
21 MENTAL RETARDATION 204 (1983); Slater & Bunyard, Survey, supra note 72, at 52;
Janicki, Mayeda & Epple, Availability of Group Homes for Persons with Mental Retardation
in the United States, 21 MENTAL RETARDATION 45 (1983); Jacobson & Schwartz, Personal
and Service Characteristics Affecting Group Home Placement Success: A Prospective Analy-
sis, 21 MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (1983).
100. For authority requiring the state to adopt a least restrictive environment approach,
see In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
tive analysis, however, may be that restrictiveness and freedom
are experiences of individuals and that categorical determina-
tions of these matters will always be clumsy."'
While a well planned appropriately placed community living ar-
rangement can be a citadel of freedom, poorly integrated group
homes may create "socially isolated total institutions within the com-
munity. ' 102 Moreover, ". . .a small group home for six retarded per-
sons can be a pleasant family-like place, but it can also be a ghetto,
where handicapped persons live out their lives without the necessary
special services and without the sympathy of their neighbors."108
The degree of restriction in any facility depends upon its organi-
zation, its administration, its management, and the surrounding envi-
ronment. Freedom does not necessarily inhere in any particular resi-
dential form: "[D]oors in any institution can be locked, closed or
open. Comings and goings can be stopped, intermittent or free. Insti-
tutions can be throttling, regulating or permissive. They can defeat,
bore, or enrich. They can kill. They can stultify. They can
enliven."10
B. Normalization
Much of the foregoing indicates that living arrangements not in
harmony with the community will have little normalizing effect. Fur-
ther, the environment outside the home is of little consequence unless
the resident can interact with it:
In order to provide a normalizing environment, community
care facilities must provide an environment which is actively en-
riched both with internal programs and external contact and
exchange.
While this is obvious in large facilities, it is particularly
critical in small care facilities, which, by virtue of size, must
include activities and external interaction to approximate a nor-
mal environment. Isolation in small care facilities results in a
social setting populated only by developmentally disabled per-
sons, thus restricting activities, the number of role models, and
experiences necessary for normalization to occur. "
101. Roos, The Law and Mentally Retarded People: An Uncertain Future, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 613,622 (1979).
102. Butler & Biannes, A Typology of Community Care Facilities and Differential
Normalization Outcomes, in RESEARCH TO PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 342 (Mittler
ed. 1977)[hereinafter cited as Butler & Biannes].
103. M. Egg-Beres, Integration of the Mentally Retarded in Society, in I RESEARCH TO
PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 352 (Mittler ed.1977.)
104. J. Throne, Is Deinstitutionalization Dictated by the Least Restrictive Principle?
(paper presented at the Meeting of the American Association on Mental Deficiency 1979)
cited in Brief for Amicus Curiae Congress of Advocates for the Retarded, Inc., Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900.
105. Butler & Biannes, supra, note 102, at 345.
Unquestionably, the handicapped can and should be treated
more normally than they have been. To treat them as if they are
already normal may not be to develop their capacities to the fullest,
however. Care must be personalized. A legislative standard should
neither be crafted to expiate social guilt or be held a panacea for
past ills. The integrity of the citizen together with that of the com-
munity should be paramount. Any truly viable proposal should se-
cure the human dignity of all participants and preserve "the ability
to form peer groups for the patients, groups where they are no longer
the least efficient member and where they are not ridiculed because
of their inadequacy.9
106
Finally, community living arrangements have proven incapable
of providing comprehensive care or programming adequate to the
needs of the participants. The marked heterogeneity of the relevant
populations militates against any single pattern of care. Further,
comprehensive services are "logistically difficult to provide in scat-
tered facilities serving individuals or small groups.' 07
Obviously, a community living arrangement serving a handful
of residents cannot provide the necessary services itself. Nor can it
safely rely on services in the community, because retarded people
require the care of specialists. This is true not only for those services
most directly associated with the retarded (such as unique educa-
tional programs, therapy, etc.), but also for virtually all the services
a retarded person needs. For example, even for what would ordina-
rily be a routine illness, a general practitioner in the community is
likely to experience great difficulty in attempting to treat a pro-
foundly retarded adult with multiple disabilities who cannot describe
his symptoms, whose behavior may be erratic, and whose disabilities
are likely to be unfamiliar to the doctor.108 Even were it possible to
provide the necessary specialized services at sites in the community,
assuring the residents of each of the separate community living ar-
rangements access to those services as needed would be extremely
difficult. 09
Further, from the view of those charged with providing care, the
salaries are low, opportunities for advancement few and the demands
of employment provide little personal privacy. °10 The result is a po-
106. D. Primrose, Asylum, in 1 RESEARCH TO PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 26
(Mittler ed. 1977).
107. M. BEGAB & S. RICHARDSON, supra, note 99, at 18.
108. See J. Clements. Medical Services in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded, in
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES at 317-18.
109. Brief for Amicus Curiae Congress of Advocates for the Retarded, Inc., p. 16, n. 23,
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984).
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As early as 1970, Scheerenberger. . . noted in a review of community services
that generic community services are staffed with personnel who have limited
tential for significant staff turnover."' Such a situation is unsatisfac-
tory in assuring the continuity of care necessary for successful reha-
bilitation and normalization.
C. Statutory Limitations
In any discussion of community living arrangements, there is
virtual unanimity in perceiving the peerless existence and cultural
value of the family. Facilities are often located deep within residen-
tial areas in order to take advantage of the patent and latent value
content as expressed in the community through the concentration
and association of residential units of similar character. Further-
more, group homes, depending upon their composition, may not be
capable of exhibiting the same value content. "Far too much debate
over the rights of the mentally disabled has revolved around the ef-
fort to discredit 'institutionalization.' Yet for those familiar with
care settings, affixing labels is the beginning rather than the end of
the inquiry." 112 One commentator has observed that,
[tihe distinction between institutions and community is a false
one. A human community is composed of people and their insti-
tutions . . . Small and medium sized community-based residen-
tial facilities, group homes, and foster homes are institutions
too. . . . The issue is not one of institutionalization versus dein-
stitutionalization. . . . The issue is what kinds of institutions
knowledge of handicapping conditions, particularly severe forms of mental retar-
dation. Studies that have investigated general characteristics of residential pri-
mary care providers indicate that on the average these individuals have twelve
years of education, enjoy working with mentally retarded persons, and usually
accepted the job for personal satisfaction.
In addition, a nationwide survey of 2,000 community residential facility ad-
ministrators reports staffing and personnel areas such as recruitment of qualified
staff, reduction of turnover rates, and staff training as the most frequently iden-
tified problems in residential settings. . .(citations omitted). . . As Lakin,
Bruininks, Hill, and Hauber. . . note, the rate of direct-care staff turnover is
one of the most serious problems in the provision of residential care. Public ex-
pense results from high staff turnover. . . (citations omitted) .. , and even
greater costs are incurred when the effects of high staff turnover rates on the
quality of care offered are considered (citations omitted)...
Developing a well-trained residential staff is a goal that may prove to be one
of the most difficult to meet challenges in the development of a community-
based service system for developmentally disabled individuals. High staff turno-
ver rates aggravated by limited training opportunities and a perception by staff
as fulfilling basically a maintenance role reduce the possibilities of having a posi-
tive effect on residents most in need.
Slater & Bunyard, Survey, supra, note 72 at 53, 57.
111. "In the five-county area served by Pennhurst, the average duration of employment
of a CLA staff person is six months." I, Longitudinal Study of the Court-Ordered Deinstitu-
tionalization of Pennhurst: Historical Overview at 84 (1980).
112. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association, Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900.
best serve .... 118
In recognition of this character, many statutes place limits on
the number of facility units that might occupy a given geographic
area.""' At least two reasons support these provisions. The first is to
assure that any adverse impact of group homes is dispersed and that
its intensity is minimized. This is to protect, as far as is practical, the
residential integrity of the neighborhood.
The second is a recognition that a concentration of facilities
would create an institutional care environment and adversely impact
their ability to access family values. As when a pebble is tossed into
a pond, the impact is greatest at the focus and the influence dissi-
pates as the concentric circles grow. A CRF gains its greatest value
from the families closest to its location. In return, these families sur-
render the greatest value and experience the greatest disruption if
the unit does not possess and promote the traditional value content.
The force of placement, either positive or negative, is transferred to
the immediate environment. In addition, the more distant the loca-
tion the weaker the ripple. Ultimately the disturbance becomes so
small that it blends with the tide of traditional social dynamics. Fur-
ther, just as the temptation is great to select the calmest and clearest
pond so as to maximize the effect of the toss, so too is it tempting to
place a non-conforming group home in the deepest residential
setting.
D. Constitutional Limitations
1. Taking Clause.-A provision for placement of CRF's
through preemption of local initiative may be taking of property
without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.
Valuable interests are indisputably transferred. But questions
may arise whether they are to be considered property and, if so, of
any economic value. The Supreme Court has not cowered in recog-
nizing intangible interests, frequently emphasizing that property
within the context of the "taking clause" includes all the distinctive
corporal attributes and qualities. Property is not to be limited in the
• . .vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with re-
spect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.
[Instead, it] . . . denotes[s] the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing as the right to possess, use
113. Throne, Deinstitutionalization: Too Wide a Swath, 17 MENTAL RETARDATION 171
(1979) cited in Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association, Pennhurst State
School &. Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900.
114. See supra note 95.
and dispose of it. . . .The constitutional provision is addressed
to every sort of interest the citizen may possess.11
The property herein is either an accessory to the use of residen-
tial real estate or those values of family and neighborhood identifica-
tion expressed through occupancy of residential real estate, the
financial worth of which is measured by the value of real estate.1 0
The intangibles, of course, have demonstrable economic worth.
Group homes are placed in certain areas in order to exploit defined
qualities that the group home cannot economically produce.
Information is available on the impact of CRF's on neighbor-
hood property values; the studies disagree, however, on the quality
impact. In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association,"' the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that eight or fewer mentally retarded persons
who were occupy a residence were not reasonably included within
the definition of a family set forth in the city zoning ordinance. The
court further held that adjacent property owners would suffer a low-
ering of value of their property if residential facilities for mentally
retarded persons were permitted in that area.
On the other hand, an analysis of Minnesota property values as
affected by the placement of CRF's indicates no substantial impact
on value.ll 8 However, this study, like most, is general in attitude,
does not specify the character of the group homes addressed or the
character of the neighborhood affected, and uses questionable mea-
sures of value. Unfortunately, after lengthy analysis, the Minnesota
study concludes:
While the results of this analysis unequivocally supports this
conclusion (change in property values are not related to the
presence of a group home) there are limitations to this data.
First, assessed value (the measure of value used in the study)
115. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
116. This imputed value may be likened in some ways to liberty under the United States
constitution. "[Tihe Due Process Clause is triggered by a variety of interests, some much more
important than others. These interests have included a wide range of freedoms in the purely
commercial area such as the freedom to contract and the right to set one's own prices and
wages." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 545 (1977)(White, dissenting). In
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) the Court took a characteristically broad view of
"liberty:"
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
117. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980).
118. Study obtained from Cumberland Perry Association for Retarded Citizens, Carlisle
PA 17013 (1983).
may be an imperfect measure of market value. . .Second, be-
cause many of the group homes in the sample were established
after 1979, the small number of property transactions may re-
flect a general downturn in the housing market rather than satis-
faction of property owners with their new group home
neighbors.119
Group home advocates often explain the apparent inconsistency
by concluding that if a potential buyer seeking a family residential
experience were aware of the existence of a CRF in the neighbor-
hood, it might adversely affect his decision to buy, and thereby lower
values. If he were not aware of the existence of the CRF, it would
not. The studies finding no impact usually rested upon an expecta-
tion that a buyer is unaware of the existence of a CRF in the neigh-
borhood where he chooses to buy. The point being promoted is that
the care taken of the physical property external to the household is
indistinguishable from other properties in the neighborhood. Discus-
sion of the intangible social qualities is avoided.
It seems apparent that CRF impact on property values would be
appropriately measured only by a standard of fair market value.
Such a criterion requires a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under compulsion to buy or sell and each possessing reasonable
information about the character of the property and the transactions.
Measures that are not sensitive to complete information or measures
such as replacement value or assessed value are not adequate.
Therefore, value is a relative question of fact, not necessarily
determinative of the issue of taking. For example, in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., ° the Supreme Court found a
per se taking in the de minimis physical occupation of one-eighth
cubic foot of roof space by a television cable.
The Fifth Amendment reads in part: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized 1"I that this guarantee
• . .was designed to bar government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."' 2
In applying this policy, the Court's decisions have identified sev-
eral significant factors:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
119. Id.
120. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
121. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419; Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
122. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, rele-
vant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action."'
The placement of CRF's may result in a non-consensual servi-
tude of adjacent properties borne disproportionately, if at all, by
other properties of similar character. Further, insofar as the facility
is permitted to locate within any zone, it is the antithesis of a com-
prehensive plan of land use control and may be likened to discrimi-
natory reverse spot zoning:
[WJhere government prohibits a noninjurious use, the
Court has ruled that a taking does not take place if the prohibi-
tion applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby "se-
cure(s) an average reciprocity of advantage. . ." (citation omit-
ted) It is for this reason that zoning does not constitute a
"taking." While zoning at times reduces individual property val-
ues, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to
conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one
aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.
Here, however, a . . . loss has been imposed. . .[lit is
uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits. .... It is exactly
this imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the
"taking" protection is directed. The Fifth Amendment "prevents
the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he sur-
renders to the public something more and different from that
which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and
just equivalent shall be returned to him."(citation
omitted). .. 2
Not only are such adjacent residents asked to contribute value
content, but they do so on behalf of government in favor of private
third parties. "[S]uch an occupation is qualitatively more severe
than a regulation of the use of the property, . . . since the owner
may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the
invasion." 
12 5
The taking is dramatically demonstrated by the high residential
density permitted in group homes. Greater numbers of residents
make administration of a residential facility more economical. The
cost of efficient management is shifting to the neighborhood where
the facility is located. "Police power regulations . . . can destroy the
use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good
123. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124.
124. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis in
original)(1982).
just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of
property."1"
Finally, the property owner is under a duty, at the risk of per-
sonal loss of value to his property, to maintain the therapeutic envi-
ronment. The zoning code that remains in place usually limits the
private use of a dwelling to a traditional single family. It does not
permit private property owners in residential districts use of their
properties comparable to that of the CRF. If, for the purpose of ar-
gument, it is possible to assume that a CRF has an adverse impact
on the neighborhood in which it is located, a residential owner could
readily compensate for the loss. Under certain statutes, CRF's would
be able to house up to fourteen unrelated persons. As a general rule,
owners in residential areas could not respond by renting or selling
their units to a similar number of unrelated persons. A property
owner must sell, rent, or occupy his property as a single-family unit
notwithstanding a decrease in the market value for the property as a
single-family dwelling. Essentially, the CRF might change a neigh-
borhood to one more suited to multi-family or institutional use, yet
simultaneously restrain a property owner from converting to that
use.
On the other hand, if residential owners were allowed to readily
convert, a municipality might find that it would rapidly lose the sin-
gle-family quality of some of its neighborhoods, a quality already
noted as potentially indispensible to the maintenance of the polity.
Finally a statute that provides that group homes may not be located
within a prescribed distance of one another, restrains a person, to the
benefit of a particular CRF, from renting, selling or converting the
property to a CRF.
Certainly, when an individual purchases a dwelling in a residen-
tial environment, he reasonably expects that the investment would
permit access to traditional family values. Governmental action ma-
terially frustrating that expectation might reasonably be considered
a compensible taking.
2. Unlawful delegation of legislative power.-A provision that
CRF's may be placed in any zone including that restricted to single-
family dwellings may be an unlawful delegation of legislative power,
without standards, to private third parties. Zoning restrictions aim to
advance a plan of comprehensive use for the common good of all
community members. "Under our constitutional assumptions, all
power derives from the people" 1' 7 who may delegate it to representa-
126. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1980)(Brennan,
J., dissenting).
127. East Lake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1975).
tives to allocate the benefits and burdens to property, presumably
without discrimination. Insofar as a private, non-governmental entity
can make decisions of distribution, it usurps governmental sover-
eignty. The Supreme Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' 8 held that
a delegation of legislative power to private parties offends the theme
of a democratic republic and therefore unconstitutional. The Court
concluded:
The power conferred . . . is, in effect, the power to regulate the
affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in
its most offensive form; for it is not even delegation to an official
or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private
persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the in-
terests of others in the same business. . . . And a statute which
attempts to confer such a power undertakes an intolerable and
unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private
property.'"
Further, the delegation to select a site for a facility may be
without any standards or guides. Courts have frequently held that
delegations to government agencies should be accompanied by dis-
cernible standards in order that the conduct of the delegee may be
evaluated and constrained within the will of the legislature. Absent
such standards, agencies not only perform legislative functions but
are heir to legislative power.'8 0
128. 298 U.S. 238 (1935).
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130. On a related topic, see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't of Gen. Serv. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Philadelphia, 73 Pa. Commw. Ct. 525, 459 A.2d 50 (1983), appeal
docketed No. 114-116, E.D. Appeal Docket 1983, which is currently before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The Department of Public Welfare sought a variance from the Philadelphia
Zoning Board of Adjustment to permit location of a workshop facility for the mentally handi-
capped in a residential zoning district. The Zoning Hearing Board denied the request, and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. That court reversed
the Board's determination. The Neighbors Association and the Board appealed. The equally
divided Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Common
Pleas. See 73 Pa. Commw. Ct. 525, 459 A.2d 50.
The fundamental question now before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether the
Legislature, by enacting § 202 of the Mental Health and Retardation Act (MHRA), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4202 (Purdon 1969), superseded the legislative grant of zoning authority
to the City of Philadelphia. (Section 202 of the MHRA permits the Department of Public
Welfare to lease or otherwise acquire facilities through the Department of General Services).
Certain observations may be offered.
First, § 202 of the MHRA contains no express statement of preemption of local zoning
initiative. One might compare the legislative statement in § 202 to those in other jurisdictions
which assert that community residential facilities may be located in residential areas notwith-
standing zoning limitations.
Second, it would be reasonable to conclude that the legislature was cognizant of land use
considerations when drafting § 202 of the MHRA and its grant of zoning authority to Phila-
delphia. The grant stated, in part: "Whenever the regulations made under the authority of this
[Zoning] Act require... or impose other standards than are required in any other stat-
ute... the provision of the regulations made under authority of the Act shall govern." Had the
Legislature intended to preempt local initiative, it could have expressly so provided. It has
apparently permitted zoning superiority to remain intact.
3. Special laws.-A statute granting power to select private
persons to determine placement of community living arrangements
may be a special law prohibited by, or lack the uniformity required
by, state constitutions. The Supreme Court of Ohio, considering such
a statute in Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association,al concluded:
[TIhese sections of law (relating to residential placement of
group homes) selectively excise certain of the police powers of
local government that have been granted to municipalities by
the Constitution. Thus, such sections . . . are not general laws.
It is in our view that [they] . . . suffer an additional infir-
mity in that they are special laws prohibited by . . . the Ohio
Constitution. Such constitutional provision states, in pertinent
part, that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation throughout the state. .. ."
The requirement of uniform operation throughout the state
of laws of a general nature does not forbid different treatment of
Third, in City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d
607 (1976), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged that municipal corporations are
agents of the state exercising subordinate powers. Therefore, a dispute between a municipality
and a state agency cannot be resolved simply by suggesting that a state agency's decisionmak-
ing supersedes municipal decisionmaking. In examining a number of additional cases involving
conflict between municipal zoning laws and the ininitiatives of other public entities, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, quoting the Supreme Court of New Jersey, noted:
The question of what governmental units or instrumentalities are immune from
municipal land use regulations, and to what extent, is not one properly suscepti-
ble to absolute or ritualistic answer. Courts have, however, frequently resolved
such conflicts in perhaps too simplistic terms by the use of labels rather than
through reasoned adjudication of the critical question of which governmental
interest should prevail in the particular relationship or factual situation.
Id. at 180, 360 A.2d at 610 (quoting Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluto, 60 N.J. 142, 150, 286
A.2d 697, 701 (1972)).
The Court concurred in City of Pittsburgh that there was no legislative intent to permit
the Bureau of Corrections to establish a pre-release center in a residential neighborhood or
[IN?] contravention of local zoning regulations. The court suggested that a grant of the power
of eminent domain to a state agency may contribute to an indication of an intent to supercede
local zoning initiative. The suggestion was founded upon Pemberton Appeal, 434 Pa. 249, 252
A.2d 597 (1969). In Pemberton, the court determined that § 702 of the Public School Code
(24 PA. STAT. ANN § 7-702 (Purdon 1962)) "clearly and unequivocally vests precise and spe-
cific powers in the school district. . .to locate, determine, acquire and if necessary, condemn
all real estate necessary for schools. And the township zoning regulation clearly is determining
location of the schools. It thus cannot be squared with [The School Code]." 434 Pa. at 256,
252 A.2d at 600 (emphasis added). It was not only the power of eminent domain that dictated
preemption but also the expressed legislative intent that the local school district have power to
locate the school. Therefore, the power of eminent domain, like the power of acquisition in-
cluded in § 202 of the MHRA, is a method by which government may gain title to property. It
does not, per se, express a plenary power to determine the location. In addition, eminent do-
main is to be exercised in the public interest and land use controls are an expression of such
interest. The power to establish workshops and a municipal power to zone should be deter-
mined to be of co-equal authority. Consequently, the statutes must be applied contemporane-
ously. Since workshops can be accomodated, in the public interest, in Philadelphia in conform-
ity with the Zoning Code, there is no inherent incompatibility and no need to force a decision
of supersession. In conclusion, since there is no express legislative interest in overriding zoning,
the recommended approach would be to reconcile the interests in a cooperative manner by
deferring to the legislature and encouraging it to continue to examine the public interest in this
arena.
131. 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980).
various or types of citizens, but does prohibit non-uniform classi-
fication is such be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious."'
IX. Conclusion and Recommendations
The family is a unique and elemental integrant of the state. The
symbiotic relationship between this smallest political unit and the
progressively larger components such as neighborhood, community,
and nation, results from complex psycho-social phenomena. While
organic law has, times, obligated the state to curtail expression of
select values transmitted through this vehicle of affiliation, such as
racial, religious, and sexual discrimination, effectually, government
depends upon the general integrity of the family unit for its contin-
ued existence.
In pursuit of the goal of habilitation and normalization of dis-
abled citizens, the family residential environment is perceived as a
peerless positive value. Group home advocates acknowledge:
1. that residential qualities exist;
2. that residential qualities develop spontaneously through
the association of residential units of similar character;
3. that the qualities vary with the residential form;
4. that multi-family character varies from single-family
characters; and
5. that the deepest residential quality develops when the in-
fluences of commercial, industrial and institutional uses are ab-
sent and use is exclusively single-family dwellings.
Implicit in the equation is the necessity of interfamilial identifi-
cation. Intrafamilial character could not be maintained, much less
developed, absent the psychogenetic quality. Appreciation of this dis-
tinctive feature has induced proponents of community living arrange-
ments to conclude that concentrating such facilities in a given geo-
graphic area would diminish the required residential experience.
A major impediment to the provision of adequate housing facili-
ties for the handicapped has been the demand for programs of sub-
stantive affirmative action. Expressed in the form of advocacy for or
legislation permitting placement of community facilities in any area
without consideration of the extrinsic or intrinsic qualities of either
the arrangement or the neighborhood, the exaction responds to the
needs of neither the proposed residents nor the adjacent owners or
occupiers.
The key concern in defining the rights of the developmentally
disabled to adequate habilitation - while assuring the continuation
of a family environment - should not be the polemic debate over
labelling the particular form of care facility. It should be vindicating
132. Id. at 271-72, 407 N.E.2d at 1378.
individual claims of quality of life.1 " An assessment of each pa-
tient's needs as compared to what identified community environ-
ments can reasonably provide is the principle concern. Therefore, the
program should be one of procedural affirmative action.
Yet refining the duty to provide adequate housing to the handi-
capped does not permit the perception of operating in pristine sur-
roundings. For example, in defining the contours of the least restric-
tive environment,
it is vital to place that right in a meaningful clinical context. If
such a right is to advance rather than imperil the welfare of the
developmentally disabled, it must be understood . . . as a means
to a more important end, habilitation. . . . [A] person's liberties
though very important, are not the person's sole, or at times
even his primary, interests. This is uniquely so for the retarded.
Learned Hand asked "What do we mean when we say that first
of all we seek liberty?" He answered in part, "freedom from
oppression, freedom from want, freedom to be ourselves." The
simple fact is that the retarded can be freed from the oppression
of their bodily needs and helped to grown within themselves only
through the intensive services of others, never by the mere nega-
tive rights and passive liberties which are the grist of natural
law theorists. .... For the retarded person, the truly significant
meaning which can be given to the "least restrictive alternative"
is the setting which does not unnecessarily restrict liberties and
is most conducive to habilitation.'"
Accordingly, any responsible program of procedural affirmative
action would emphasize cooperation at the community level to iden-
tify the particular needs of proposed residents as well as the charac-
ter traits of the living arrangement and suitably match those with
the established uses. Community living arrangements must be intelli-
gently integrated into a comprehensive plan of land use.
As the life style of a traditional family unit (single-family) dif-
fers from that of a group of young adults living together (multi-fam-
ily or institutional), so the experience of a small number of foster
children dependent upon two adults in an owner-occupied dwelling
unit (single-family character) differs from that of a group of four to
eight adults or young adults in a single structure (multi-dwelling
character). Furthermore, the characteristics of many CRF's are not
intended to be traditional residential. While they may desire to emu-
late some of the qualities of traditional residential living they do not
aspire to mirror traditional single-family life. In fact, they are essen-
133. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 95, 114 (3d Cir.
1979).
134. Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychiatric Association in Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900.
tially institutional.
The myriad facility forms should be matched with the current
uses with which they are most compatible. For example, a group
home for mildly retarded adults or young adults may not intend to
reflect the character of a single-family district. To the contrary, the
interest in such a facility may be to echo the value content and life
style of a unigenerational collection of individuals of similar age.
Such a facility might better serve the residents as well as the com-
munity were it placed in a multi-family residential neighborhood. In
addition, such considerations would tend to preserve the family envi-
ronment for living arrangements that have a legitimate need for
sharing patent and latent familial content.
Proposed "for-profit" uses should be heavily scrutinized to as-
sure that any commercial nature of the enterprise is compatible with
the area in which it is to be located. Insofar as business aspects are
evident and would adversely affect residential areas, neighbors
should not be asked to make an economic or social sacrifice to the
economic benefit of that person or group proposing the for-profit
CRF.
In evaluating a proposition, it would be relevant to inquire
whether the property would be owner-occupied. If the person propos-
ing the CRF is an absentee investor in housing services he is more
likely interested in an economic return on his investment and less
likely to be concerned with preserving residential values.186 Commer-
cial and investment motives are more appropriate in commercial/
institutional districts.
Proposals should be scrutinized to assure that they are not actu-
ally institutional uses. A CRF with institutional or organizational
support may be an extension of the institution. Insofar as the head of
the "putative family" is an institution, its neighborhood interests
may be impersonal. Those who make decisions about the CRF re-
semble an absentee investor. They do not usually mirror the values
of an owner-occupier. The group or entity that establishes general
policy for the CRF is off-site and may be inaccessible and unrespon-
sive to the neighbors. In addition, an institution may be obligated to
sacrifice the goals of a particular CRF for broader social or program
goals. It may be impassive to the local resident group in favor of
135. Over 90% of CLA's are privately owned, and unlike large state institutions, these
small enterprises frequently go out of business. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Congress of Advo-
cates for the Retarded, Inc., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.CT. 900.
See also BEGAB & RICHARDSON, supra note 99 at 16: "Some of the problems relevant to
prolonged care, however, apply here (foster homes). . . Independent operators, often married
couples seeking additional sources of income, offer little assurance of long range stability. The
disruption impact to the retarded. . . and the community of precipitate closings can be very
devastating."
response to a group more removed. Insofar as the organization sup-
ports more than one program or CRF, it will necessarily balance the
needs of all programs in allocating the benefits to one program. This
ability to spread risk among a group of facilities may result in a
legitimate business decision adverse to a particular neighborhood.
Further, when an institution is the family head, the CRF may
not intend to imitate traditional residential values. Such qualities as:
1. a rotating staff;
2. on-site medical or education services;
3. the hope or expectation that the residents will be short
term occupiers;
4. lack of permanent live-in authority figures;
5. a desire to consume the benefits of a particular neighbor-
hood without individual emotional or financial commitments to
the future of that neighborhood;
6. a density higher than in a normal residential unit;
.7. persons employed in the CRF as opposed to residing
there; and
8. lack of intergenerational exchange of values,
indicate that such a CRF is more appropriate in an institutional dis-
trict or in a high density residential area where the influence of com-
merce and institution have already affected the residential
environment.'86
Last, evidence exists that CRF's have historically cost less to
administer than larger institutions. 87 A likely explanation is that
such facilities rely more heavily on general community resources. In-
sofar as the the facilities' residents come from the community pro-
viding the services, that community equitably bears the burdens of
care. If the proposed residents come from locations outside the rele-
vant supporting tax base, the costs are distributed inequitably. Fi-
nally, in light of the demonstrated reduced cost, nothing justifies in-
creasing the marginal population density in units that have a
legitimate need for access for family values. Such increased density
is a degradation of family environment and therefore a shifting of
cost to adjacent property owners. A savings to the community is an
expense to proximate property owners. In lieu of providing a scheme
of compensation for such a taking of value, attention should be upon
reducing the density in legitimate "family" environments. This will
inure to the benefit of not only group home occupants but also those
residents of the neighborhood in which group homes are located.
The issues are complex and the solutions are not easy. An intel-
136. See Christ United Methodist Church of Bethel Park, 58 Pa. Commw. 610, 428
A.2d 745 (1981)(juvenile group home fell within description "institutional" and was not con-
sidered a single-family dwelling and thus was permissibly excluded from residential district).
ligent, cooperative plan can accomodate most if not all residential
facilities with the least average sacrifice. Such a plan must identify
the qualities of group facilities and match them with the qualities of
the area in which they are to be placed.

